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IN THE SUPRE11E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
HILLIAH L. HUTCHINSOll, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case 1lo. 16037 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEilT 
STATE11ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The State of Utah, appellant herein, appeals from a 
judgment of the District Court, Third Judicial District, the 
Honorable David K. \linder presiding, which affirmed on appeal 
a ruling of the City Court of Salt Lake City wherein Sections 
1-10-4 and l-10-8 Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County 
(ROSLCO) were declared unconstitutional and void. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELO!,.l 
This matter came before the district court upon the 
State's appeal of the city court ruling referred to above pur-
suant to the authority of Section 78-4-17(6) Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953). The district court, in a memorandum decision, 
affirmed the ruling of the city court (TR 49-50), finding 
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Sections l-10-4 and l-10-8 of the ROSLCO unconstitutional and 
void. 
?ELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment of 
the district court and a ruling that Sections 1-10-4 and l-10-8 
of the ROSLCO are unconstitutional and void. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February of 1978, the respondent, Salt Lake County 
Commissioner \villiam L. Hutchinson, was charged with two counts 
of Failure to File Campaign Statements, in violation of Sections 
1-10-4 and 1-10-8 of the ROSLCO. The respondent filed a motion 
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that Salt Lake County 
was without authority to pass said ordinances. The matter came 
before the city court on April 11, 1978, with the Honorable 
Melvin Morris presiding. After hearing arguments from both par-
ties, Judge Morris ruled that Salt Lake County was without con-
stitutional or statutory authority to pass Sections 1-10-4 and 
1-10-3 of the ROSLCO, and therefore that said ordinances were 
void, and the complaint was dismissed. The State of Utah filed 
its notice of appeal to the district court on the 26th of April, 
1978. On the 15th of September, 1978, the district court, the 
Honorable David K. Winder presiding, entered its memorandum 
decision affirming the city court's judgment, finding Sections 
1-10-4 and 1-10-8 of the ROSLCO unconstitutional and void. 
-2-
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ARGUME~T 
POINT I 
THE STATE OF UTAH HAS PREEl1PTED THE ENTI'li: 
FIELD OF REGULATION IN t1ATTERS HlVOLVING 
ELECTIONS. 
In Title 20 of Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended, denoted "Elections," the State has expressly preempted 
the regulation of all elections for public office in the follow-
ing relevant particulars: the control of general elections (in-
cluding all county elections) at Utah Code Annotated, Section 
20-l-2; the regulation of countv conventions at Utah Code Anno-
tated, Section 20-3-2(2); the selection of nominees for county 
offices at Utah Code Annotated, Section 20-4-7; the regulation 
of county election returns at Utah Code Annotated, Section 
20-8-9.5; a broad range of election offenses (applicable to 
county elections) at Utah Code Annotated, Section 20-13-l, et 
seq.; and the regulation of election contests (encompassing 
county elections) at Utah Code Annotated, Section 20-5-l, et 
seq. 
In addition, the State has enacted legislation deal-
ing exclusively with the election of county commissioners: the 
number of county commissioners at Utah Code Annotated, Section 
17-5-l; the eligibility and election of candidates for county 
commissioner at Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-5-2; and the 
term of office for county commissioners at Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 17-5-3. 
-3-
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The State's only delegation of authority to counties 
with respect to elections can be found in Section 17-5-18: 
17-5-13. [Election districts]--
They may establish, abolish and 
~hange election districts, appoint 
~nspectors and judges of election, 
canvass all election returns, ex-
cept as otherwise provided by law, 
may declare the result, order the 
county clerk to issue certificates 
of elections, and shall perform 
such other duties in relation to 
elections as are or may be pre-
scribed by law. They shall alter 
or divide election districts when-
ever necessary in such manner that 
each election district shall contain 
not more than five hundred voters. 
No precinct or election district 
shall be established or abolished 
or the boundaries of any precinct 
or district altered or changed 
within ninety days prior to any 
election. (Emphasis added.) 
The statutory language "shall perform such other 
duties in relation to elections as are or may be prescribed by 
law" indicates that the Legislature intended to retain in itsel 
all authority over county elections, leaving in the county the 
power to perform only those duties that the Legislature ex-
pressly prescribes. In other words, the State retains complete 
power over elections, and the county has only those powers 
specifically relinquished by the State. 
The county ordinances involved in the instant case 
are clearly outside of this statutory delegation. The State 
-4-
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has never expressly delegated to the counties the authority 
to enact ordinances regulating campaign finances in county 
elections, and the Salt Lake County Commission was in no 
manner performing duties prescribed by law. 
Further evidence of the State's intention to preempt 
the regulation of elections can be found in Chapter 13 of 
Title 20 of Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, entitled 
"Election Offenses." The scope of this chapter is found in 
Section 20-13-20 and extends to county elections. 
20-13-2. [Chapter applicable to 
all elections] .--The provisions 
of this chapter shall extend so 
far as applicable to all elections 
provided by law, special, general, 
municipal and school elections, 
and to primary elections in c~t~es 
of the first and the second class. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Section 20-13-l deals with bribery in elections: 
20-13-l. [Bribery in elections] 
It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by himself 
or through any other person: 
(2) To give, offer or promise any 
office, place or employment, or to 
promise or procure, or endeavor to 
procure, any office, place of em-
ployment, to or for any vote:, or 
to or for any other person, ~n 
order to induce such voter to vote 
or refrain from voting at any 
election provided by law; or to 
induce any voter to refrain from 
voting at such election for any 
-5-
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particular person or persons, or 
to obtain the oolitical suoporr-
or aid of anv such erson ~r oer-
sons. Emphasis added. 
(3) To advance or pav, or cause 
to be Paid, any monev or other 
valuable thing to, or for the use 
of, anv other Person with the in-
tent that the same, or any part 
thereof, shall be used in briberv 
at any election provided by law; 
or to knowingly pay, or cause to 
be paid, any money or other valu-
able thing to anv person in dis-
charge or repaYQent of any money 
expended ,.;holly or in part in 
bribery ~t any such election. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The above statute allows the State to prosecute a 
broad range of corrupt practices by candidates in all elections, 
including the selling of favors through campaign contributions. 
The appellant states in its brief that the ordinances 
in question were in part designed to "assure that the financial 
interests of candidates present no conflict with the public 
trust." Appellant's Brief, p. 7. A conflict with the public 
trust would occur only where the candidate promised employment 
or some other qu·id pro quo to the contributor in exchange for 
the contribution, and such conduct is subject to prosecution 
by the State under Section 20-13-1(2). Thus, the argument by 
appellant that the ordinances in question are indisPensable to 
protect the good order, etc. of the inhabitants is rendered 
ineffective and without merit because the State can prosecute 
-6- J 
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candidate dishonesty through Chapter 13 of Title 20. In addi-
tion, Section 20-13-l et seq. further exemplifies the State's 
intention to preempt to itself the power to control corrupt 
financial practices in all elections. 
The appellant, ignoring the existence of Section 
20-13-l et seq., argues that the State cut back on its pre-
emption in the area of election finance regulations in enacting 
the amended version of Section 20-14-l et seq., Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953), as amended. Section 20-14-l et seq., entitled 
the "Currupt Practices in Elections Act," was initially enacted 
in 1971 as a campaign financing disclosure statute applicable 
to all candidates for public office in Utah except candidates 
for the national offices of President and Vice President. In 
1973, the Legislature amended Section 20-14-l et seq. limiting 
its application to candidates for the state offices of Governor, 
Secretary of State/Lieutenant Governor, and Attorney General. 
It is appellant's contention (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 9) that the 1973 amendment was intended to accomplish two 
things: 
(1) To limit its application to candidates for the 
three enumerated public offices and 
(2) To exempt all other public officials from its 
application. 
The appellant then argues that the purpose of this amendment 
was to cut back on the preempted area and thus allow local 
-7-
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governments to enact their own campaign practices act. 
The defendant suggests that the intent of the Legis-
lature, in enacting the amended version of Section 20-14-1 et 
seq., was to exclude local government candidates from the appli-
cation of the type of regulations found in Chapter 14 of Title 
20 and to have the election offenses regulations of Chapter 13 
solely govern the conduct of local government candidates. The 
State never intended to relinquish its control over county 
elections to the counties, it simply intended to modify its 
control mechanism. Therefore, since the county ordinances in 
question involve the type of regulations found in 20-14-1 et 
seq., the ordinances are in conflict with the Legislature's in-
tent to exclude local government candidates from this type of 
regulatory control. 
The appellant cites Salt Lake Citv v. Kusse, 93 P.2d 
671 (Utah 1938) and Salt Lake City v. Allred, 430 P.2d 371 
(Utah 1967) to support its contention that when the State has 
preempted an area, local governments can pass ordinances so 
long as they are not inconsistent with the State statutes. It 
should be noted, however, that in both Kusse, ~. and Allred, 
supra, the statutes were upheld because the State had expressly 
relinquished some of its preempted power to the local govern-
ments by statute through an express grant of power. There has 
been no express relinquishment of the State's power to control 
elections in the instant case, and absent some express grant of 
-8-
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authority from the State to the counties, the counties are 
powerless to act in the preempted area. 
In conclusion, Salt Lake County was wholly without 
authority to enact the ordinances at issue in the instant case. 
The State has preempted the entire field of election regulation, 
and under Section 17-15-18 counties may only enact ordinances 
dealing with county elections where such ordinances are in 
performance of duties expressly prescribed by la>v. The State 
did not expressly relinquish its power to the counties to regu-
late election financing, and the ordinances in question were 
not expressly prescribed by law. Therefore, Sections l-10-4 
and 1-10-8 of the ROSLCO are void based on Salt Lake County's 
lack of authority to enact them. 
POINT II 
SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY, EITHER EXPRESS OR 
IMPLIED TO PASS SECTIONS 1-10-4 AND 1-10-8 
OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY. 
The origin and extent of a county's power was dealt 
with by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Cottonwood City 
Electors v. Salt Lake Countv Board of Commissioners, 28 Utah 
2d 121, 499 P.2d 270 (1972). There the court stated: 
The county is a political sub~ivi­
sion of the state whose creat~on 
and whose powers and duties are de-
rived from the constitution and 
statutory law. (P. 271.) 
-9-
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In other cases dealing with the county's relationship to the 
state, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he county is 
a part of the state and is subject to the control of the legis-
lature," and that a "county is but an agency of the state, sub-
servient to it." Hansen v. Public Emolovee Retirement Systems 
Board of A~stration, 246 P.2d 591, 599 (Utah 1952); Salt 
Lake County v. Liquor .Control Commission, ll Utah 2d 235, 357 
p. 2d 488. 489 (1960). 
In Cottonwood City Electors, suora, the court stated 
further that: 
[A county] has such powers as are 
specifically enunciated by law and 
those which are reasonably and 
necessarily implied in order to 
discharge those responsibilities. 
(P. 271.) 
The same position as that taken in Cottonwood City 
Electors, supra, was applied to county commissioners in Carbon 
County v. Hamilton, 48 Utah 503, 160 P. 765 (1916). There the 
court stated "that the doctrine that county commissioners can 
exercise such po~ers only as are expressly or by necessary 
implication conferred upon them by the statute is elementary." 
Id. 768. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions 
that political subdivisions can only exercise such powers as are 
expressly granted to them and such other implied powers that are 
-10-
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indispensably necessary to carry out the express powers. Salt 
Lake City v. Allred, 19 Utah 2d 254, 430 P. 2d 371 (1967); 
SteEhenson v. Salt Lake City CorE., 7 Utah 2d 28, 317 P.2d 597 
(1957); Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 
702 (1955); American Fork City v. Robinson, 77 Utah 168, 292 
P. 249 (1930); Wadsworth v. Santaquin City, 28 P.2d 161 (1933); 
Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 61 Utah 533, 216 P. 234 (1923). 
In interpreting the extent of the power granted to 
the political subdivision, it is the clear and ~-.rell established 
rule in this state that the court will strictly construe the 
power granted. A typical articulation of this position can be 
found in Ritholz v. City of Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P.2d 
701 (1955). In that case the court stated: 
This court has generally adhered 
to a policy of rather strictly 
limiting the extension of the 
powers of a city by implication. 
Id. 704. 
The Utah Supreme Court has in no way backed away 
from this position. As recently as April 10, 1978, in the 
case of Layton City v. SEeth, 578 P.2d 828 (1978), the court 
reiterated its prior position quoting from Nesfell v. Ogden 
City, 249 P.2d 507, 508 (1952) and stating that: 
Grants of oower to cities are 
strictly c~nstrued to the ex-
clusion of implied powers not 
reasonably necessary in carrying 
-11-
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out the purposes of the express 
powers granted. Id. 829. 
If, after strictly construing the statute, any doubt 
remains as to the existence of the grant of power, the court 
must deny the power. This was aptly stated in the case of 
Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, 150 P.2d 773 (Utah 1944). There the 
court stated: 
To determine whether or not a city 
has the power to enact any particu-
lar ordinance the court must look 
to the legislative grant of power 
and to the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. If there is a reason-
able doubt concerning the existence 
of a particular power, that doubt 
should be resolved against the city, 
and the power should be denied. Id. 
774. (Emphasis added.) 
This position is also supported by Parker v. Provo City Corpora-
tion, 543 P.2d 769 (Utah 1975); Utah Rapid Transit Co. v. Ogden 
City, 58 P.2d l (Utah 1936); and Salt Lake City v. Sutter, 216 
P. 234 (Utah 1923). 
The a~pellant cites as the express grant of authority 
to enable it to pass the ordinances in question Sections 
17-5-35, Utah Code Annotated (1953) and 17-5-77, Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953). Section 17-5-35 reads as follows: 
[Police, buildin3 and sanitary 
regulations--Power to make.]--
They may make and enforce with~n 
the limits of the county, outslde 
-12-
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the limits of incorporated cities 
an~ t~wns, all such local, police, 
bu~ld~ng and sanitary regulations 
as are not in conflict with general 
l~s. 
This statute gives the county the express power to 
pass ordinances concerning police regulations, building regu-
lations and sanitary regulations. 
This statute can in no way be construed as conferring 
on the county the express power to regulate campaign financing. 
Further, it is difficult to imagine how the regulation of cam-
paign financing could be construed to be reasonably necessary 
much less indispensable in carrying out police, building and 
sanitary regulations. 
Therefore Cottonwood City Electors, ~· and the 
policy of strict construction found in Ritholz, supra, and 
Speth, supra, compels the conclusion that Section 17-5-35, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) does not grant to the county any 
power, express or implied, to regulate campaign financing. At 
the very least, upon reading the above statute, it is clear 
that reasonable doubt exists as to whether the power has been 
conferred upon the county. Therefore, Nance, supra; Parker, 
supra; and Utah Rapid Transit, supra, would require the 
county's power to regulate campaign financing be denied. 
The appellant also cites Section 17-5-77 as being the 
grant of authority enabling the county to regulate campaign 
-13-
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financing. Section 17-5-77 reads as follows: 
[Ordinances--Power to enact--
Penalty for violation] .--The 
board of county commissioners may 
pass all ordinances and rules and 
make all regulations, not repug-
~ant.to law, necessary for carry-
~ng ~nto effect or discharging 
the powers and duties conferred 
by this title, and such as are 
necessary and proper to provide 
for the safety, and preserve the 
~ealth, promote the prosperity, 
~mprove the morals, peace and 
good order, comfort and conveni-
ence of the county and the in-
habitants thereof, and for the 
protection of property therein; 
and may enforce obedience to such 
ordinances with such fines or 
penalties as the board may deem 
proper; provided, that the punish-
ment of any offense shall be by 
fine in any sum less than $300 
or by imprisonment not to exceed 
six months, or by both such fine 
and imprisonment. The board of 
county commissioners may pass 
ordinances to control air pollu-
tion. 
The above statute cannot be construed as an express 
grant of power to the county to regulate campaign financing. 
Further, it is difficult to imagine how the regulation of cam-
paign financing could be construed to be indispensable in pro-
viding for the health, safety, welfare, morals, and good order 
of the inhabitants. It should be emphasized that in interpret-
ing the statute the court must strictly construe any attempt 
at extending any implied powers. Ritholz, supra, and~· 
-14-
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supra. If the implied power is not reasonably necessary to 
carry out the express power, then the ordinance should be 
voided, Soeth, ~- It seems clear that the regulation of 
campaign financing by the county is not reasonably necessary 
to insure the health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants. 
The appellant cites Kusse, supra, as an example for 
the types of ordinances that will be upheld under broad grants 
of power to municipalities. However, it should be pointed out 
that driving under the influence of alcohol is traditionally 
within the police pmvers of local governments. The ordinance 
in Salt Lake City v. Allred, supra, was also clearly a police 
power ordinance. It is difficult to understand how examples 
of ordinances regulating prostitution and driving under the 
influence as being within the police power of local governments 
support the notion that the power to regulate campaign financ-
ing could be reasonably implied from the "good order" clause 
of Section 17-5-77. 
It should also be noted that Kusse, supra, the case 
that appellapt so heavily relies on, limits the extension of 
implied powers to those powers indispensable to the express 
powers, not just merely convenient. 
Even if the ordinances in question could be construed 
to be reasonably necessary to carry out Section 17-5-77, it is 
clear that reasonable doubt exists as to whether the State in-
tended to create this power in the county. Further, the 
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appellant bears the burden of proof to show the power was 
granted. Nance, supra; Parker, supra. Therefore, :~ance, sup~; 
Parker, supra; and Utah Rapid Transit Co., ~· would require 
the court to deny the existence of the power and void ·the ordi-
nances in question. 
In conclusion, for the county to have the power to 
regulate campaign financing, the county's power must be (l) 
specific or (2) necessarily implied from and indispensable to 
the carrying out of the express power. The pov1ers granted to 
the county by ·the State can be found in Title 17 of Utah Code 
Annotated. No section in that title authorizes the county to 
regulate election financing. Similarly, no provision of Title 
20 entitled "Elections" allows the county to regulate election 
financing. Further, the regulation of election financing is 
not necessarily implied from or indispensable to the carrying 
out of any of the express powers granted to the county under 
Title 17 of Utah Code Annotated (1953). At the very least, 
reasonable doubt exists as to whether the questioned power 
exists. Therefore, the power should be denied and the ROSLCO 
1-10-1, et seq., should be voided. 
POINT III 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ORDINM~CE 1-10-1, ET 
SEQ. , ARE IN VIOL<\TION OF ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 24 AND ARTICLE XI, SECTION 4 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, Section 24 states: 
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[Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation. 
Article XI, Section 4 states: 
[Uniform county government.] 
The Legislature shall establish 
a system of County government, 
which shall be uniform through-
out the State, and by general 
laws shall provide for precinct 
and township organizations. 
The Legislature has enacted uniform statutes to con-
trol and regulate the election of public officials. Those 
statutes can be found in Title 20 of Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
and Chapters 4 and 5 of Title 17, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
and are discussed more fully in Points I and II of this brief. 
There could be no uniform operation and enforcement 
of these statutes if this court were to allow local government 
to obtain the power to regulate local elections. There are 29 
counties and 324 cities in the State of Utah. If this court 
were to open the door of regulating elections to local govern-
ments, there'could potentially be 453 different election 
statutes. This would clearly frustrate the uniform operation 
of Utah's general elections laws and would thus violate 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
Elections are indispensable to the system of county 
government, and elections must be included as part of that 
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system. To allow each of the 29 counties to create their own 
election regulations would l·n ff t 79 d'~f e ec create ~ l.c erent systems 
of county government throughout the State and thus frustrate 
the uniform system of county government. Therefore, ROSLCO 
l-10-l, et seq., are in violation of Article XI, Section 4 of 
the Utah Constitution and should be declared void. 
In conclusion, to allow each city and county to enact 
ordinances regulating local elections would be in violation of 
Article I, Section 24 and Article XI, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, ROSLCO l-l0-4 and l-l0-8 should be 
declared unconstitutional and void. 
CONCLUSION 
Salt Lake County was totally without power to enact 
the ordinances in question. The State has retained in itself 
all power over the regulation of campaign financing and has pre-
empted the entire field of regulating elections and the conduct 
of candidates. 
The State has not granted to the counties any ex-
pressed powers t·o regulate campaign financing. The regulation 
of campaign financing can in no way be implied as indispensable 
to any express power granted nor could it even be considered 
reasonably necessary to the carrying out of any express power 
granted to the counties. At the very least, there exists reason-
able, even substantial, doubt as to 1"hether or not the State 
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intended to create in the counties the right to control cam-
paign financing. And the appellant has failed in meeting its 
burden of proof to show the power exists. Therefore, the 
County had no power to enact the ROSLCO 1-10-1, et seq., and 
said ordinances must be declared void. 
To allow each of 29 counties and 324 cities to enact 
their own election laws would render impossible the uniform 
operation of the Utah statutory laws regulating election con-
duct and thus contrary to the requirements of Article I, Sec-
tion 24. Further, to allow each of the 29 counties to create 
their own election laws would frustrate the constitutional re-
quirement of uniform systems of county government and there-
fore violate Article XI, Section 4. 
For the foregoing reasons, the respondent respect-
fully requests that this court declare ROSLCO 1-10-1, et seq., 
unconstitutional and void. 
DATED this _ ___,.J."'--~1--"-ti;:.....,.._,___day of l:1arch, 19 79. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~L C lo"&'•· Phil L. Hansen 1 
HANSEN AND HA.l'l'SE~ 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for ~espondent 
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I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent was served on the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office, C-220 Metropolitan Hall of Justice, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111, this ~l-tL day of March, 1979. 
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